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WHEN THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT COLLIDES WITH THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
THE CASE OF PUBLIC CITIZEN v. OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
Public law litigation' on environmental issues has proliferated
as Americans begin to recognize the consequences of abusing our
natural resources.2 The frontal attack on actions deemed harmful
to the environment has often focused on initiatives developed or
approved by agencies within the federal government. 3 The weap-
ons of choice often utilized in this battle against federal agency
actions detrimental to the environment are the Administrative
I See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAav. L. REV.
1281, 1288 (1976) (describing public law model and suggesting how it affects role of courts
in our political and legal systems); Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Pub-
lic Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1984) (fo-
cusing on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), as example of new type of public
law litigation in which plaintiffs seek to enforce legal principles offending their moral and
political values); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLum. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988) (tracing standing doctrine based on private law litiga-
tion); see also Stephen M. MacFarlane, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Stand-
ing, the APA, and the Future of Environmental Litigation, 54 ALB. L. REv. 863, 864 (1990)
(stating that explosion of lawsuits involving environment coincided with increased interest
in public law litigation which "emphasized the legitimacy of judicial review in vindicating
rights and regulatory benefits conferred by Congress on broad segments of the public").
2 See, e.g., Peter Lallas et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade: To-
ward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HIv. ENVTL. L. REv. 271, 273 (1992).
The heightened awareness of the nexus between trade and the environment can be traced
to several significant developments, including the recognition of "the ecological interdepen-
dence of life on earth and the global nature and potentially profound consequences of many
environmental problems," the increased volume and expansion of international trade over
the past half century, and the release of studies showing "that environmental protection
and international trade policies affect each other in several important ways." Id. The au-
thors suggest that the Brundfland Report illustrates that "long term environmental protec-
tion is an integral requirement of sustainable economic development policy, and that envi-
ronmentally sound economic development, supported by open trade, is essential for
longterm environmental protection." Id.; see also Eva H. Hanks & John L. Hanks, An Envi-
ronmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230, 244-65 (1970) (discussing whether National Environmental
Policy Act creates judicially protected interest in environment capable of being asserted by
citizenry).
3 See VALEmE M. FoGELMAm, GuIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENwVRoNMENTAL POLICY ACT xi
(1990) (stating that between one thousand and two thousand published judicial decisions
have been written involving challenges to agency action).
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Procedure Act ("APA) 4 and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 ("NEPA). 5 The adoption of NEPA marked a departure
from a one dimensional approach within the federal government
which subordinated the importance of environmental manage-
ment.6 Under NEPA, federal agencies are required to develop an
4 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1988) [hereinafter "APA"]. The
APA was enacted primarily as a vehicle to ensure fair and efficient procedures within the
burgeoning administrative bureaucracy while also serving as a unifying force within the
federal government. See Marshall J. Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Per-
spective, 72 VA. L. REv. 337, 338 (1986). The APA has remained relatively unchanged
throughout the years. Id. at 358. Major amendments have included the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act in 1967, the abolishment of sovereign immunity, and the Government in Sun-
shine Act. Id. Within the APAs a provision for judicial review of agency action was included
in order to guard against "excess of power and abusive exercise of power in derogation of
private right." Id.
5 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-1901, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). Section 4332 pro-
vides, in relevant part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the
Federal Government shall -
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning
and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on
Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate con-
sideration in decision-making along with economic and technical considerations;
(E) study, develop and describe appropriate alternative to recommended courses of ac-
tion any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources;
(F) recognize the worldwide and long range character of environmental problems and,
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support
to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international coopera-
tion in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment;
(G) make available... advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment;
(H) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of re-
source-oriented projects; and
(I) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act.
Id. The Council on Environmental Quality was responsible for assisting in the preparation
of the President's annual environmental quality report and served as advisor to the Presi-
dent on environmental policy. Id. §§ 4341-47. By executive order, the Council may also
promulgate environmental impact statement regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R.
123 (1977). According to these regulations, agencies must develop Environmental Assess-
ments for projects which may be subject to the NEPA environmental impact statement
requirement. Id. These Environmental Assessments allow the agency to determine
whether an impact statement is needed or to make a finding that no significant impact is
foreseen. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(aXl) (1993). Once an impact statement is deemed necessary,
the agency must so notify through the Federal Register. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1993); see also
VALERim M. FOGELMAN, GumE TO THE NATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 3-15 (1990)
(providing detailed summary of NEPA regulations).
6 See ExEcuTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESMENT: COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL=TY, ENvI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY: 21sT ANNUAL REPORT 189 (1990) [hereinafter CEQ REPORT]; see also
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environmental impact statement for any major recommendation,
legislative proposal, or significant undertaking which may materi-
ally affect the quality of the environment.7 Through what has
been characterized as the "action enforcing provision"8 of NEPA,
Congress sought to ensure that the possible environmental effects
of agency actions would become an essential part of the internal
agency decision-making process. 9 However, as NEPA confers no
M. Diane Barber, Bridging the Environmental Gap: The Application of NEPA to the Mexico-
United States Bilateral Trade Agreement, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 429, 434 (1992) (discussing
need for NEPA); A. Dan Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy De-
mands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J.
645, 658 (1972). "Federal legislation was necessary because the creation of program, mis-
sion-oriented agencies has insured that these environmental considerations have been sys-
tematically under-represented in most short- and long-range decision making." Id. "Ex-
isting agencies were established to supervise the development of our natural resources
consistent with the ethic which has prevailed throughout this country's history, and thus,
they tended to overstress the benefits of development and to explore insufficiently the less
environmentally detrimental alternatives to current methods of meeting their programmed
objectives." Id.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). This section provides in relevant part:
(2) All agencies of the federal government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation or other
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
8 See CEQ REPORT, supra note 6, at 196. Congressional oversight committees have recog-
nized the role this provision has played "in the gain in environmental information available
to the federal government and the public... [and] increasing the public ability to respond
to proposed actions and to recognize their relationship to public criticism...." Id.; see also
David Burleson, Note, NEPA at 21: Over the Hill Already?, 24 AKRON L. REv. 623, 625
(1991). The author quoted Senator Henry Jackson, a NEPA sponsor, who stated: "[Wihat is
needed in restructuring the governmental side of the problem is to legislatively create...
an action forcing procedure the departments must comply with. Otherwise these lofty dec-
larations are nothing more than that." Id.
9 See CEQ REPORT, supra note 6. NEPA embodied Congress's "expressed determination
to move the nation in a comprehensive manner toward accommodation of the disparate
goals of economic growth and preservation of a quality environment." Id.; S. REP. No. 296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969). The report stated: "The pursuit of greater material wealth
and increased productivity, the quest for scientific knowledge, and the requirements of
world wide responsibilities have had unplanned and often unforeseen consequences in the
form of resource depletion, pollution, ill-conceived urbanization, and other aspects of envi-
ronmental degradation." Id. Though the drafters may not have foreseen an instrument in
the nature of NAFTA, the language and the policy behind NEPA demonstrates that the
"future oriented scheme adopted by Congress was designed explicitly to take account of
impending as well as present crises in this country and in the world as a whole". City of Los
Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(quoting language of NEPA).
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right of action, the APA provides the means of enforcement by pri-
vate parties.' 0
Relying on NEPA, some environmental groups have attacked
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")." NAFTA,
ratified by Congress 2 and signed by President George Bush on
December 17, 1992, will create a common market in North
America by gradually eradicating or minimizing tariff and non-
tariff barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.' 3
The treaty will create the world's largest free trade zone.' 4 How-
ever, the environmental effects of NAFTA, and the manner in
which they will be monitored, was a point of contention through-
out the negotiating process. 15 Some commentators have posited
Only a clear and unavoidable conflict between an agency's own statutory mandate and
NEPA's directives will allow an agency to escape NEPA's reach. See id. at 491; Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (relieving agency of NEPA duties where specific statutory obligation
made performance of duties impossible). Congress has at times passed legislation specifi-
cally exempting agency projects from NEPA, and the courts have upheld such provisions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 719(hXc) (1988) (exempting judicial review under NEPA regarding ade-
quacy of Alaska pipeline environmental impact statement); 15 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1988) (ex-
empting certain transmissions facilities at specific site).
10 See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410-11 (1971) (holding judicial review of agency action upon challenge of private party
to be available under APA unless expressly forbidden by statute).
11 See, e.g., Environmental Community Cites Flaws in Border Plan, Environmental Re-
view, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 136 (Mar. 11, 1992); Environmental Groups Criticize Nego-
tiations on North American Free Trade Agreement, Inside U.S. Trade, (Nov. 20, 1992), at
17; Environmentals' Letter on NAFTA, Inside U.S. Trade, (July 24, 1992) at 16 (reprinting
letter from 50 American, Canadian, and Mexican environmental groups). But see Gary Lee,
At Border, NAFTA's Environmental Promise Is Murky, WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al
(noting Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth opposed NAFTA while National Wildlife Fed-
eration supported it); Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Oppo-
nents, Inside U.S. Trade, Sept. 17, 1993, at S-1 (outlining split in environmental groups on
NAFTA).
12 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993). On November 17, 1993, the House of Representatives adopted legislation
to implement NAFTA starting January 1, 1994 by a vote of 234 to 200. Id. The Senate
followed suit on November 20, 1993. Id.
13 See infra note 14 (describing genesis of NAFTA).
14 See Mickey Kantor, At Long Last, A Trade Pact to be Proud Of, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
1993, at A14. The proposed NAFTA will create a continental market including 360 million
people and a GNP of $6 trillion. Id. NAFIA's genesis was marked by an agreement, signed
on June 10, 1990, between President George Bush and Mexican President Carlos Salinas to
minimize tariff and non-tariff barriers between the two nations. Id. Canada joined the
agreement in February of 1991 and in June of 1991 President Bush authorized the Office of
the United States Trade Representative to begin negotiations. Id. Formal negotiations be-
gan on June 12, 1991. Id. See generally Testimony of Carla A Hills, United States Trade
Representative, Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, United
States House of Representatives, June 14, 1990, 22 ST. MARS L.J. 583, 585 (1991) (outlin-
ing U.S. policy toward Mexico and future of United States-Mexico trade relations).
15 See Michael Gregory, Environment, Sustainable Development, Public Participation,
and the NAFTA:A Retrospective, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 99, 99 (1992). In a detailed exposi-
tion of NAFTA's evolution, the author stated that the negotiation process involved an ex-
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that the trade agreement will have dire consequences on the envi-
ronment and on domestic laws pertaining to the environment. 16
Specifically, they argue NAFTA will ultimately lead to a "down-
ward harmonization" of U.S. domestic environmental standards
in an effort to promote trade.' 7 Moreover, NAFTA will create in-
centives for industry to relocate to Mexico and evade more strin-
gent environmental laws.' 8 Such environmental concerns fueled
the development of the North American Agreement on Environ-
traordinary level of public participation and comment and that the trade agreement's ap-
proval depended on the treatment given to environmental issues by the administration. Id.;
see also John K. Kim & James P. Cargas, The Environmental Side Agreements to the North
American Free Trade Agreement: Background and Analysis, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L.
Inst.) 10,720, 10,722 (1993). Environmental groups sought approval by NAFTA negotiators
of 5 basic demands:
1) increased public participation, access to information, and oversight in dispute reso-
lution and monitoring processes i.e. "transparency"; 2) improved enforcement and
monitoring of environmental laws already in existence and the threat of trade sanc-
tions for non-enforcement; 3) secure and adequate sources of funding for environmen-
tal infrastructure, environmental enforcement, and clean up efforts; 4) protection of
national, provincial, state and local environmental and health standards from chal-
lenges under NAFTA; and 5) the establishment and protections of process standards or
production process methods.
Id.
16 See Ron Wyden, Foreword, Using Trade Agreements to Protect the Environment, 7 J.
ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 1, 1-2 (1992). The author stated that "the interaction between trade and
the environment has rocketed to prominence" and led to creation of voting bloc of over 40
Congressman who conditioned their support for NAFTA on pledge by President Bush to
"preserve the environment." Id.
17 See Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari at 6, Public Citizen v. Office of the Trade Represen-
tative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1994).
Plaintiffs alleged NAFTA would:
[i]ncrease trade-related and other land transportation, which will increase air pollu-
tion in all three countries .... Third, NAFTA established rules for evaluating whether
domestic food safety and other health and environmental standards impose impermis-
sible trade barriers.... Depending on the precise meaning of NAFTA's standard's
provisions, measures such as emissions standards, pesticide residue bans, and restric-
tions on the transportation of hazardous materials. [Moreover], by reducing tariffs and
other trade barriers in some economic sectors but not others, NAFTA creates incen-
tives for certain types of development which will, in turn, have significant environmen-
tal impacts. For example, NAFTA's energy chapter expressly permits incentives for oil
and gas exploration, but not for renewable energy or energy efficiency, which will in-
crease development of non-renewable energy sources in all three countries.
Id.; see also Daniel Esty, Beyond Rio: Trade and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 387, 390
(1992). The author highlighted four prominent environmental concerns raised by NAFTA.
Id. at 390-91. First, that linking the United States with Mexico through a trade agreement
will result in a "downward harmonization" whereby high U.S. environmental standards
would be lowered. Id. at 391. Second, pollution from Mexican industry along the U.S.-Mex-
ico border would spill over into the United States. Id. Third, environmental groups were
not involved in the process of developing NAFTA and therefore the effects on the environ-
ment were not taken into consideration. Id. Fourth, "dirty" American industries will move
factories to Mexico to evade tough U.S. anti-pollution laws, creating a "pollution haven." Id.
at 392.
18 See Kurt Hofgard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free Trade on U.S.
Environmental Protection, 23 ENvTL. L. 635, 637 (1993) (providing thorough analysis of
NAFTA's potential environmental impacts).
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mental Cooperation ("side agreement") which established and em-
powered a three nation bureaucracy to monitor and pursue envi-
ronmental problems. 9
However, in Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative,20 Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth, and the Si-
erra Club claimed that the side agreement was insufficient and
brought suit 2' to compel the Office of the United States Trade
Representative ("Trade Office") to produce an environmental im-
pact statement before NAFTA was submitted to Congress.22 In
19 See generally Kim & Cargas, supra note 15, at 10,725-26. Initial negotiations on the
Environmental Side Agreement to NAFTA began under the Bush Administration on De-
cember 15, 1992. Id. Little progress was made. Id. The Clinton Administration restarted
the negotiations in early 1993 wherein Mexican and American representatives agreed to
several general principles reflecting respect for national sovereignty, "that NAFTA would
not be re-opened, and that the side agreements should not open the door for disguised
protectionism. Id. President Clinton signed the finished document on September 14, 1993.
Id. The Agreement "has been described as an international executive agreement" and ac-
companied both NAFTA and the implementing legislation to Congress. Id.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("Side Agreement"), is
roughly broken into seven parts. Id. Part one of the side agreement lists the overall objec-
tives. Id. Part two sets forth general commitments of the Parties to establish laws and
procedures providing for high levels of environmental protection and enforcement. Id. Part
three sets forth the general structure of the new Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion. Id. It is to be comprised of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee. Id. Part four of the Side Agreement contains provisions relating to cooperation and
provision of information among the parties. Id. Part five contains the general procedure for
consultation and resolution of disputes among the signatory nations or Parties. Id. The
dispute resolution procedures are available only when a Party complains that another
Party has engaged in a "persistent pattern of failure... to effectively enforce its environ-
mental law." Id. Finally, parts six and seven of the Side Agreements contain miscellaneous
general provisions, including the definitional article. Id.; see also Completing the Package:
Supplemental Agreements on Environment, Labor and Import Surges; North American Free
Trade Agreement Supplemental Provisions, BusNEss AM., Oct. 18, 1993, at 26 (discussing
side agreement).
20 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
21 Public Citizen v. Office of the Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, 140 (D.D.C.
1992) [hereinafter Public Citizen I]. In their original suit, plaintiffs, Public Citizen, the
Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, environmental advocacy groups based in Washington
D.C., also sought an environmental impact statement for the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Id. The complaint initially sought
an injunction prohibiting the OTR and President Bush from entering into the trade agree-
ment until the environmental impact requirement was met. Id. However, plaintiffs ac-
knowledged that such relief might interfere with the President's constitutional powers and
therefore removed this element of the claim. Id. In the district court, plaintiffs argued that
the defendant's failure to develop an environmental impact statement adversely affected
their ability to inform Congress and the public of the environmental and health conse-
quences of the trade agreement. Id.
22 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d at 550.
Plaintiffs urged judicial intervention during the negotiation process since NAFTA would
receive "fast track" treatment, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 2107-2487, §§ 2902-2903 (1988),
when submitted to Congress. Id. When the President requests fast track authority for an
agreement, Congress must affirmatively act to deny it or it is granted. 19 U.S.C. § 2191
(1988). Fast track procedures were previously limited to agreements made prior to June 1,
1991, but Congress extended it by two years. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(bXl) (1988). Under the fast
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their second and final foray in court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the plain-
tiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of "final agency action" as
required by the APA.23 Analogizing the facts of Public Citizen to
those presented in the Supreme Court decision of Franklin v. Mas-
sachusetts,24 and applying the standard for finality articulated
therein, the circuit court held that no final action was presented
since NAFTA had not been submitted to Congress by the Presi-
dent.25 The court further reasoned that since finality could only be
realized by an act of the President, and he was not an agency
within the meaning of the APA, no "final agency action" could ex-
ist to confer jurisdiction on the plaintiffs.26
Part One of this Note follows the evolution of the litigation
through the federal courts. Part Two briefly examines the nature
of standing under NEPA and the APA, and analyzes the implica-
tions of applying the finality standard articulated in Franklin v.
Massachusetts to Public Citizen II. Part Three argues that the
Public Citizen II court should have addressed the narrower issue
of whether requiring the Trade Office to develop an environmental
impact statement for NAFTA would be consistent with the foreign
policy of the United States. Part Three also evaluates the deci-
sional law involving NEPA's application in, and potential conflict
with, foreign policy initiatives of the United States.
I. PUBLIC CITIZEN V. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
A. Public Citizen I
Plaintiffs brought suit on August 1, 1991, to compel the Trade
Office to develop an environmental impact statement for
track process, once NAFTA is submitted to Congress, it has 60 days to approve or rejects it
without amendment. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c),(e),(d) (1988); see also, Hearing Before the Sub-
committee of Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1991) (reviewing arguments against fast track procedure based on environmental con-
cerns); Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast Track for International Trade Agreements, 5
FLA_ J. INrL L. 471 (1990) (providing detailed analysis of fast track process).
23 See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court decisions in
Public Citizen II).
24 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
25 See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court's analogy of
Public Citizen to Franklin decision).
26 See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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NAFTA.2 7 In analyzing plaintiffs' claims, the district court stated
that they were required to meet the constitutional requirements of
standing and ripeness, and the separate general review provisions
of the APA.28 Specifically, the court reasoned that section 702 of
the APA required the identification of some "final agency action"
affecting plaintiff, and the demonstration that plaintiff was ag-
grieved within the meaning of the relevant statute. 29 Relying on
the Supreme Court's discussion of standing and ripeness in Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation,0 the district court held plaintiffs
did not have standing.3 1 The court concluded that the routine ac-
tivities of the Trade Office, as it engaged in the negotiation pro-
cess, did not constitute a major federal action significantly affect-
27 Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 141-42. In Public Citizen I plaintiffs also sought an
environmental impact statement for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). Id. In Public Citizen II plaintiffs dropped GATT from the lawsuit as it remained
unsigned whereas the basis for the second effort with NAFTA was that the President had
signed the agreement. Public Citizen H, 5 F.3d at 550-51.
28 Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 141-42.
29 Id.
30 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
31 Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 142-44. Lujan involved an attempt by the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"), a federal agency within the Department of the Interior, to
reclassify land for public and private use pursuant to a land review withdrawal program.
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 879. The National Wildlife Federation
claimed that the BLM's decision to reclassify land in Wyoming and Arizona violated sec-
tions 202 and 302 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
1712(a), 1732(a) (1988), for failing to adequately maintain the lands and consider other
uses; that its failure to adequately assess the environmental impact of the land reclassifica-
tion violated NEPA; and that its actions were an abuse of discretion under the APA. Id. In
a multilayered opinion, the Court held that plaintiffs had no standing, Id. at 898-99. It
stated that the land withdrawal review program was not a "final agency action" within the
meaning of the APA since it did not constitute a single administrative act, but referred to a
general scheme of action. Id. at 899. The Court also found that while plaintiffs' affidavits
adequately met the zone of interest test, they failed to demonstrate whether plaintiffs were
"actually affected" by the BLM's actions. Id. at 891-93.
The Lujan decision has been criticized as unduly burdening plaintiffs who seek to enforce
environmental laws. See E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of Undeclared Pro-
grams: A Statutory Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 655-56 (1991)
(asserting Lujan interpretation of APA is contrary to congressional intent); Bradley J. Lar-
sen, Casenote, Meeting the Requirements of Standing: A Framework for Environmental In-
terest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 14 HMAuisN L. REv. 277, 278 (1990)
(stating decision "represents a setback for environmental groups and those who attempt to
seek judicial review of agency action have been largely thwarted through the manipulation
of the standing doctrine"); Sarah A. Robichaud, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: The
Supreme Court Tightens the Reins on Standing for Environmental Groups, 40 CATH. U. L.
REv. 443, 470 (1991) (asserting that Justice Scalia's restrictive views on standing doctrine
were determinative in decision and will make it more difficult for environmental organiza-
tions to plead redressable harm); Edward B. Sears, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
Environmental Plaintiffs Are Tripped Up on Standing, 24 CoNN. L. REV. 293, 296 (stating
Court's decision has elevated standing requirement and represents departure from previ-
ously liberal standards for standing).
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ing the nature of the environment within the meaning of NEPA so
as to trigger the environmental impact statement obligation.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision, but directed its analysis
to the jurisdictional requirement of finality mandated by section
704 of the APA.33 Noting that a mere refusal to develop an impact
statement did not constitute "final agency action," the court re-
quired plaintiffs to delineate a concrete legislative proposal that
would trigger the obligation of preparing an environmental impact
statement.34 The circuit court found that since NAFTA was only
in draft form and susceptible to change, there was no judicially
reviewable "final agency action."35 The court concluded that judi-
cial intervention was not appropriate until a report of the proposal
was offered and the plaintiffs alleged either the inadequacy of the
environmental impact statement or its non-existence.36
B. Public Citizen II: Plaintiffs Recommence the Suit
Plaintiffs again sought judicial intervention after NAFTA was
signed by representatives of the United States, Mexico and Can-
ada on October 7, 1992.37 The cause of action was based on the
theory that "final agency action" had occurred and jurisdiction
was therefore conferred under the APA. 38 Defendants argued that
the case of Franklin v. Massachusetts39 controlled the present con-
32 Public Citizen 1, 782 F. Supp. at 143 (describing activities of Office of the Trade Repre-
sentative as "formulating negotiation positions, drafting language for proposed terms, and
communicating with other negotiating parties").
33 Public Citizen I, 970 F.2d at 918-19 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
34 Id. at 918-19.
35 Id. at 919.
36 See hi. The court also rejected plaintiffs attempts to analogize their case to Trustees
for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), where ripeness was found in an action
enjoining the Department of the Interior from submitting a report to Congress until the
Department complied with NEPA. Id. The Public Citizen I court stated that unlike Trustees
for Alaska, where the agency intended the report to contain a "proposal for legislation,"
defendants herein were not required to complete NAFTA, nor was there indisputable evi-
dence that the trade agreement would be submitted to Congress. Public Citizen 1, 970 F.2d
at 920.
In affirming the judgment, the District of Columbia Circuit reiterated the lower court's
finding that there was no final resolution on the NAFTA at the time of suit. Id. at 918-19. It
also noted that the defendants were not in any way required to complete the trade agree-
ment and declined to speculate on the likelihood that the agreement would ever become
final. Id. at 923.
37 Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Public Citizen II].
38 Id. at 23-24.
39 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
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troversy. In Franklin, the State of Massachusetts and two regis-
tered voters sued the President and other public officials alleging
that the method4 ° used to calculate the 1990 census was unconsti-
tutional,4 1 arbitrary, and capricious. 42 According to the reappor-
tionment statute,43 after the census was taken by the Secretary of
Commerce, the President would submit the tabulation to Con-
gress." In addressing the jurisdictional question under the APA,
the Supreme Court sought to determine whether any "agency" or
"final agency action" was presented, so as to allow judicial re-
view.4 5 Applying a two tier analysis, the Court first looked at
whether the agency's decision-making process was completed, and
second whether the result directly affected the parties.46 The
Court reasoned that since the statute expressly required the Pres-
ident to provide Congress with the apportionment results, it was
the President's action which would have a direct effect on the
plaintiffs. 47 Secondly, the Court concluded that since the action
40 Id. at 2771. The dispute involved the decision to use "home of record" as a method of
including overseas personnel in the census. Id. "Home of record" establishes where the
military person will be relocated after his or her term of service is completed. Id. A contro-
versy existed because the military people would designate the "home of record" in a state
with low or no income taxes rather than their place of residence. Id. Thus the Census Bu-
reau decided not to include overseas employees in the 1980 census. Id. However, the deci-
sion was made to include them in the 1990 census using home of record when other options
did not materialize. Id. at 2771-73.
41 Id. at 2773. Plaintiffs alleged that the apportionment method did not adhere to the
constitutional mandate that the number of representatives be determined by an "actual
Enumeration" of individuals "in each State." Id.; see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
42 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773.
4 Id. at 2770. The Constitution mandates that the apportionment of Representatives be
determined by an "actual Enumeration" of persons in each state "conducted every 10
years." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 3; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV cl. 2. Due'to political
considerations, Congress enacted a statute which made the apportionment process self-
executing and designated the Secretary of Commerce and the President to determine the
number of representatives without congressional participation. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at
2771; 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1988) (provides Secretary may develop census "in such form and
content as [sihe may determine').
44 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2771 (1992).
46 Id. at 2772.
46 Id. at 2773.
47 Id. The Court also rejected the existence of finality by concluding that since the Presi-
dent would amend the census report or request reformation after its submission by the
Secretary, the report constituted a "moving target" and was in the nature of a general
recommendation rather than a final determination. Id. at 2774-75. Believing that the Sec-
retary's actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Kennedy and Souter, concurred in the judgment, but found surprising and erro-
neous the Court's conclusion that deliverance of the census report to the president was not
"final agency action' within the meaning of the APA. Id. at 2783. Justice Stevens examined
the legislative history and the statutory language of the Census Act and found that Con-
gress did not intend to give the President any substantive role in the census process. Id. at
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under dispute was that of the President, and he was not an agency
within the meaning of the APA, judicial review was unavailable.48
Though the Court recognized that the APA did not explicitly ex-
clude the President,49 it held that separation of powers considera-
tions and the position of the president necessitated that the APA
not be applied to him.50
Defendants argued that the Public Citizen court was similarly
constrained and did not have jurisdiction because NAFTA, like
the census report, was a product of presidential action and there-
fore outside the scope of NEPA and the APA.51 Characterizing de-
fendant's arguments as a "misread[ing]" of the relevant statutes
and case law, 52 the district court held that once signed and sub-
mitted to Congress, the trade agreement had been finalized, and
therefore constituted "final agency action."5 3 The court distin-
guished Franklin by concluding that the instrument involved
therein was a tentative recommendation whereas NAFTA was a
completed document.54 Moreover, plaintiffs had standing under
NEPA because of the "reasonable risk" that NAFTA would not
2779-80. Rather, his participation was to be wholly ministerial and not discretionary. Id. at
2781. Moreover, Stevens asserted that the characterization by the majority of the Census
Report as a "tentative recommendation" was misleading because the Census Report is a
public document and is released to federal and state agencies at the same time it is submit-
ted to the President. Id. at 2782. If the President changed the figures after receiving them
from the Secretary, the states and the federal government would be working with different
numbers, thereby destroying the goal of uniformity. Id. at 2783. Stevens stated that the
"logic of the Court's opinion escapes [him], and apparently was not obvious to the Solicitor
General, for he advances no such novel claim in his argument for reversal." Id. at 2779. The
appropriate focus of the finality inquiry should have been the Secretary of Commerce. Id.
48 Id. at 2772. The concurrence stated that since it found the Secretary's actions to be
reviewable, it did not need to consider whether the President was an agency within the
meaning of the APA. Id. at 2783 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(C) (1988). The APA defines agency as "each authority of
the government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency, but does not include-(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United
States; (C) the government of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the
government of the District of Columbia." Id. at § 701(b)(1)(A).
50 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775 (1992).
51 Public Citizen v. Office of the Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1993).
52 Id. at 25.
53 Id. at 21.
54 Id. at 11-26. [Tihe NAFTA is in stark contrast to the census report in Franklin be-
cause the NAFTA is a complete, and most importantly, a final product that will not be
changed before submission to Congress. The NAFTA that was negotiated and signed by the
Trade Representative is the same document that shall be submitted to Congress and which
is the subject of this suit." Id.
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only give rise to environmental injury, but also affect state and
federal health and environmental laws.55
Relying on the Franklin decision, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court judgment and held that no "final agency action" existed to
permit judicial review.56 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Mikva
adopted the reasoning of Franklin in three respects.57 First, he
adopted the definition of "final agency action" as an event occur-
ring when the agency's decision making process was completed,
and the result directly affected the parties.58 He then concluded
that it was the non-obligatory transmittal of NAFTA by the Presi-
dent, not finalization of negotiations by the Trade Office, which
would affect the plaintiffs.59 Until that sequence of events was
55 Id. at 27. While claiming no reliance, the court focused on plaintiff's catalogue of
health and environmental measures possibly affected by NAFTA such as pesticide residue
standards, chemical bans, bans on seafood imports based on certain environmental criteria,
and pollution control. Id. at 27 n.7, 29 n.11. The court further emphasized the problems at
the notorious limited free trade zone, known as the maquiladora program, as evidence that
environmental harm to individual members of the plaintiff organizations on the United
States-Mexico border were concrete enough to demonstrate standing. Id. at 28; see gener-
ally Angela C. Montez, Note, The Run Past the Border: Consequences of Treating the Envi-
ronment under NAFTA as a Border Issue, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 417, 419 (1993).
The maquiladora program was instituted by Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and
allows foreign businesses to operate assembly plants along a border encompassing 2000
miles from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico and 65 miles on each side of the interna-
tional boundary. Id. at 420-21. Through this program, certain goods are imported duty free
into Mexico by wholly owned subsidiaries of the participating businesses. Id. The program's
popularity stems from the benefits derived by businesses which utilize the cheap labor
while also avoiding having to pay double duties on their finished goods. Id. At the same
time, the maquiladora plants employ one tenth of Mexico's labor force and the industry is
the second largest generator of foreign exchange. Id. Yet these factors have contributed to
the creation of an environmental disaster area. Id. at 422. The contaminated water has
caused widespread hepatitis along the Mexican border and in Arizona, hepatitis outbreaks
are twenty times the national average. Id. at 422 n.33.
In order to address these concerns, the "Agreement Between the United States and the
United Mexican State on Cooperation for the Improvement of the Environment in the Bor-
der Area" was developed in 1983. Id. at 423. A second plan, the Integrated Environmental
Plan for the United States-Mexico Border Area was signed in March 1992. Id. at 417; see
also Daniel I. Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriquez, Environmental Aspects of Ma-
quiladora Operations: A Note of Caution for United States Parent Corporations, 22 ST.
MARY's L.J. 659, 662 (1991) (discussing status of Mexican statutes and regulations pertain-
ing to environmental concerns and maquiladora plants in Mexico and exploring potential
liability of United States corporations with subsidiaries operating in maquiladora opera-
tions); Matilde K Stephenson, Mexico's Maquiladora Program: Challenges and Prospects,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589, 590 (1991) (discussing Maquiladora Program from perspective of
governments of United States and Mexico as well as industrial entities).
56 Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
57 Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 553.
58 Id. at 551 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992)).
59 Id.
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completed, plaintiffs and their members could suffer no injury. 60
Yet, as in Franklin, judicial review would be precluded because
the President was not an "agency" within the meaning of the
APA.P1 Secondly, the court emphasized the role of the President
articulated in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1974.62 The statute vests in the President, rather than the Trade
Office, the primary responsibility for developing trade agree-
ments.63 Such a mandate, according to the court, was evidence
that the legislature accorded significant importance to the role of
the President in trade negotiations. 4 Lastly, the court concluded
that NAFTA lacked finality as did the census report at issue in
Franklin, since the President had discretion to renegotiate ele-
ments of the trade agreement or even refuse to submit it to
Congress.6 5
While recognizing the "stringency of Franklin's 'direct effect' re-
quirement,"66 Chief Judge Mikva dismissed the plaintiffs' allega-
tion that its application in NEPA cases would disable the legisla-
tive environmental impact statement requirement.67 In response,
he stated that Franklin was only applicable where the President's
constitutional or statutory responsibilities were the final steps in
a series of actions which directly affected the parties.6 8 The court
declined to entertain the case on the merits,69 asserting the judici-
60 Id. at 551. Public Citizen also argued that the Trade Office's failure to develop an
environmental impact statement "directly affected" their ability to lobby Congress and dis-
seminate information. Id. at 552. The court dismissed this argument by stating that 'an
agency's failure to prepare an [environmental impact statement], by itself, is not sufficient
to trigger APA review in the absence of identifiable substantive agency action putting the
parties at risk.' Id.
61 Id. at 551-52; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
Armstrong court rejected plaintiff's arguments that the exclusion of the President from the
APA's definition of "agency" implied that the President was in fact an agency within the
court's reach. Id. at 288. Instead, it found the textual silence, the legislative history, "the
canons of construction applicable to statutes that implicate the separation of powers," and
the long standing practice of the executive branch dispositive and showing that Congress
did not intend to reach the President's action via the APA. Id. at 289.
62 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988).
63 Public Citizen 11, 5 F.3d at 552.
64 Id.
65 Id. The court found significant the fact that President Clinton had conditioned his
approval of the NAFTA on the successful development of several side agreements, while
finding insignificant his statements that he would indeed submit NAFTA to Congress. Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 552-53.
68 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
69 Id. Defendants had sought to argue "weighty constitutional positions on the separa-
tion of powers and Public Citizen's lack of standing, as well as the inapplicability of NEPA
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ary had "no role to play," and that the future of NAFTA was in the
hands of the political branches. 70
In the concurring opinion, Judge Randolph accepted the court's
interpretation of Franklin,7 1 but expressed concern that the appli-
cation of its finality standard to a NEPA case unwittingly nulli-
fied the environmental impact statement requirement. 72 He rea-
soned that if only members of Congress have the authority to
introduce and present a bill encompassing a legislative proposal
submitted by an agency, then no individual or organization could
claim to be directly affected by an agency created proposal.73 Judi-
cial review would be denied since there could never be "final
agency action" until Congress acted.74 This interpretation of the
APA, according to Judge Randolph, seemingly contradicted the in-
tent of NEPA to require the preparation of an environmental im-
pact statement earlier in the legislative process.75
II. STANDING UNDER NEPA AND THE APA
A fundamental tenet of judicial review in federal courts requires
that a complainant have standing.76 This requirement stems from
Article III of the United States Constitution which provides that
to agreements executed pursuant to the Trade Acts in general, and NAFTA in particular."
Id.
70 Id. at 553. "The political debate over NAFTA in Congress has yet to play out.
Whatever the ultimate result, however, NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands of the polit-
ical branches." Id.
71 Id. Judge Randolph agreed that there was no final action since President Clinton had
not submitted the NAFTA for Congressional approval and that even if he does submit it,
his actions are not reviewable because the President is not an agency. Id. However, Judge
Randolph stated that it was "enough to hold that regardless of whether the president's
submission of NAFTA to congress would be final action, there is no 'final' action that can be
attributed to an 'agency.'" Id.
72 Id. at 553-54.
73 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553-54 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
74 Id.
76 Id. Judge Randolph also stated "there is a big difference in saying that APA review is
unavailable and saying that officials do not have to comply with NEPA when they suggest
legislation.... I am therefore not prepared to say whether in NEPA cases, the act of pro-
posing legislation constitutes final agency action." Id. at 554 (Randolph, J., concurring).
76 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). The Court stressed
the importance of courts exercising jurisdiction only over "cases and controversies" as fun-
damental to the integrity of the separation of powers doctrine articulated in the Constitu-
tion. Id. The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" required a plaintiff suffer an
injury in fact or an invasion of a legally protected interest, and demonstrate a causal rela-
tionship between the injury and the offending action or inaction. Id.
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only "cases and controversies" may be brought before a court."
Co-existing with the constitutional limitations are court made
prudential inquiries which address whether the complainant is
within the zone of interest encompassed by the statute in
question.78
Under the APA, standing is conferred upon a NEPA petitioner
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute."7 9 In the leading case of Association
77 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating that standing requirement "assures an actual
factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact"); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (stressing complexity of case or controversy
requirement); Suntex Dairy v. Bergland, 591 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1979) (outlining how
plaintiff may be found within zone of interest of relevant statute). Standing serves the
purpose of ensuring that the parties are "truly adverse and therefore likely to present the
case effectively, ensuring that the people most directly concerned are able to litigate the
questions at issue, ensuring that a concrete case informs the court of the consequences of
its decisions, and preventing the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the pol-
icy making functions of the popularly elected branches." William Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (arguing standing doctrine is not appropriate for
accomplishing its intended purposes and offering new structure).
78 See Suntex Dairy, 591 F.2d at 1066. Suntex Dairy examined the requirements for
plaintiffs to be within the zone of interest. Id. Factors considered include whether the
plaintiff is litigating his or her own interest and not those of a third party not present, and
whether the court is adjudicating abstract questions of wide public significance or genera-
lized grievances shared by the public at large. Id.; see also Stephen McFarlane, Note, Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation: Standing, the APA, and the Future of Environmental Liti-
gation, 54 ALBANY L. REv. 863, 876 (1990) (commenting on Lujan decision and contending
it misinterpreted APA standing requirements thereby frustrating environmental groups'
enforcement of NEPA); see also Fletcher, supra note 77, at 258-262 (1988) (arguing for
much broader standing analysis under NEPA because of procedural nature).
79 A.P.A-, supra note 4, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Where a statute does not provide for
a right of action, a complainant may gain jurisdiction through the review provisions of the
APA. See Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). The legislative history of the
APA evidences the basic presumption of judicial review. Id. The APA "covers a broad spec-
trum of administrative actions" and courts ought to grant review of agency actions liber-
ally. Id. at 141-42. Only proof of clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to the
contrary should prevent judicial intervention. Id. The clear and convincing standard is not
a "rigid evidentiary test but a useful reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt
about congressional intent exists, the presumption favoring review of administrative action
is controlling." Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984). Judicial re-
view may be skirted where: "(1) the statute precludes judicial review or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1),(2) (1988).
The APA was meant to reiterate the generally accepted principles of judicial review em-
bodied in many statutes and case law. Most relevant, the judicial review provisions have in
the past been broadly construed so as to provide a cause of action where agency actions are
challenged. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977). The Califano Court found the
APA "[u]ndoubtably evinces Congress's intention and understanding that judicial review
should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials." Id.
The statute has empowered courts to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action." See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Furthermore, the court may order an
agency to act when it has unlawfully delayed or withheld the completion of some duty, 5
U.S.C. § 706(1), and may vacate agency actions found to be in violation of procedural re-
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of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,"' the Supreme
Court delineated a two part test for judicial review under the APA
which parallels and complements the constitutional and pruden-
tial limitations.8 ' The relevant inquiry is whether the complain-
ant has suffered an injury in fact, and whether he or she is within
the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute in
question.8
2
A. The 'Final Agency Action" Requirement
The APA requires there be "final agency action" for a plaintiff to
challenge the agency, but does not define the phrase.8 3 Though it
is not clear whether "final agency action" is a jurisdictional or pru-
dential condition, it is generally accepted that this requirement
addresses the issue of ripeness.8 4 In its many formulations, ripe-
quirements of law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1988). Yet as the APA does not independently
grant jurisdiction, the complainant must confront and overcome the standing require-
ments. Califano, 430 U.S. at 107.
80 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
81 See id. at 152-54.
82 See id. at 153. The zone of interest test has been the source of significant confusion in
the courts and has been criticized. See 4 KENNETH CuLP DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 24:17 at 273 (2d ed. 1979). The Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance re-
garding the meaning of the test in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97
(1987). In Clark, the Court articulated the relevant inquiry as whether the plaintiff chal-
lenging the agency action is a member of the class which Congress intended to challenge
the particular type of action taken. Id. The plaintiff was found to have standing because its
interests had a plausible relationship to the agency actions and was within the "zone of
interest" of the statute. Id.; see also Calumet Indus. v. Brock, 807 F.2d 225, 228-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff's business profits were not within zone of interest pro-
tected by OSHA).
83 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
[A]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary,
procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to
review on the review of the final agency action.
Id.; see also Edmund B. Sears, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Environmental
Plaintiffs Are Tripped Up on Standing, 24 CoNN. L. REV. 293, 313 (1991) (stating that APA
does not define "final agency action").
84 See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967) (challenge to final agency
action was not ripe because "judicial appraisal ... is likely to stand on much surer footing
in the context of a specific application'); Municipality of Anchorage v. United States, 980
F.2d 1320, 1323-25 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that memorandum of Agreement adopted by
EPA and Army Corps of Engineers was not final agency action since it did not meet ripe-
ness criteria); Dietary Supplement Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir.
1992) (determining whether agency's action was sufficiently final for judicial review by ap-
plying tests for ripeness); Mount Adams Veneer Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 339, 343
(9th Cir. 1990). The court stated that "[ijndicia of finality include: the administrative action
challenged should be a definitive statement of an agency's position; the action should have
a direct and immediate effect on the day to day business of the complaining party...
immediate compliance should be expected... ."; Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil
& Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1986). "Review is not premature if the
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ness serves the primary purpose of ensuring that courts will avoid
premature interference and will skirt entanglements in abstract
disagreements over administrative strategies.8 5 Such a policy also
protects the autonomy of agencies from judicial intervention until
a decision has been rendered and it has a material impact on the
challenging parties.86
Ripeness primarily involves the question of timing.8 7 Cases ad-
dressing the finality element in administrative actions have inter-
preted ripeness in a pragmatic and flexible manner."" Courts have
attempted to determine if an agency has "announced, solidified
and embraced" its position.8 9 The finality inquiry often focuses on
the formality of the administrative action,90 the status of the rul-
ing official, and the finality or tentative nature of the action.91
Given this interpretation, the application to Public Citizen II of
"final agency action" as construed by the Court in Franklin v.
Massachusetts9 2 was inappropriate. It was not, however, inexplic-
able. Many courts have applied the ripeness doctrine analysis in-
agency action is final and is purely legal." Id.; Texas v. United States Dep't of Energy, 764
F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1985) (Secretary's siting decisions are not "final agency actions
which are ripe for our review"); see also LEE MoDJEsKA, ADMINISTRATwE LAW PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 6.9, at 200 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
The dilemma revolving around the status of finality stems from its intermingling with
the related doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness. See 4 DAvis, supra note 82, '§ 26:10, at
485. It has been said that the "[piroblems of finality are in the area where the law of ex-
haustion joins or overlaps with the law of ripeness.... Finality may be a part of exhaus-
tion, a part of ripeness, or a third subject; courts do not clarify, for they need not." Id.
85 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). Under the ripeness doctrine,
courts are required to "evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration". Id. See generally Gene R.
Nichol Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Cmi. L. REv. 153, 161-83 (1987) (providing
comprehensive exposition on ripeness doctrine).
8 Id.
87 See CHARLEs KOCH, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW AND PRACtiCE, § 10.31 at 193 (1985).
88 See Maryland Dep't of Human Serv. v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 763
F.2d 1441, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The withholding of payment by Health and Human Serv-
ices was "final agency action" because the action, non-payment, could be completed unilat-
erally by the agency. Id. The court noted in dicta that if HHS had merely been demanding
payment by the plaintiff, rather than withholding payment, the action would not be
deemed final. Id.; see also MODJESKA, supra note 84, § 6.9, at 201.
89 See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 71 (1970) (posing finality inquiry as "whether the process of administrative deci-
sion-making has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process
of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal conse-
quences will flow from the agency action"); see also Sears, supra note 31, at 313 (noting
courts use finality requirement of APA to trigger ripeness inquiry).
90 See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 727 F. Supp. 1, 5
(D.D.C. 1989) (FDA regulatory letter was "informal and advisory" and did not constitute
final agency action).
91 See MoDJEsKA, supra note 84, § 6.9, at 201-02.92 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
768 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:751
terchangeably with that of the standing doctrine.93 As one com-
mentator hypothesized, it seems as though ripeness analysis "is in
fact a ripeness disposition, or a covert standing analysis."94 In
fact, the court in Public Citizen H had denied the plaintiffs stand-
ing much like the court in Public Citizen I, which relied on an-
other Supreme Court decision found to be antagonistic to environ-
mental plaintiffs. 5
B. Application of the Franklin Finality Standard to Legislative
Proposals
Though the decision in Public Citizen II is troubling in many
respects,96 its application of the Franklin formulation of "final
agency action" to a legislative proposal raises the most concerns.
When applied to any "recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation,"9 7 such a standard places an almost insurmountable
93 Sears, supra note 31, at 328 (arguing Lujan court raised standing requirements for
environmental plaintiffs in way that effectively undercut their ability to enforce environ-
mental legislation and proposing more liberalized standard).
94 Id.
96 See supra note 31 (discussing Lujan decision).
96 See Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d 549 at 551-52. The circuit court in Public Citizen II fo-
cused its inquiry on the President rather than the Trade Office as the "agency" being re-
quired to develop an environmental impact statement. Yet, the APA defines an "agency" as
"each authority of the government of the United States, whether or not it is within or sub-
ject to review by another agency, but does not include-(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of
the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia. . . .- 5 U.S.C. § 701(bXl) (1988).
While Congress may not have intended the President to come within the ambit of the APA,
"the legislative history of the APA indicates that Congress wanted to avoid a formalistic
definition of agency that might exclude any authority within the executive branch that
should appropriately be subject to the requirements of the APA. For this reason, Congress
thought it necessary to define agency as 'authority' rather than by name or by form ....
Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Moreover, the regulations promulgated by the Council for Environmental Quality pro-
vide that, for NEPA purposes, legislation includes "a bill or legislative proposal to Congress
developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of a federal agency... propos-
als for legislation include requests for ratification of treaties." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1993).
Regulations interpreting NEPA are entitled to great deference. See Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989). Therefore, the actions of the Trade Office
in negotiating and drafting the NAFTA were clearly sufficient to trigger NEPA's EIS re-
quirement. Petitioners Writ of Certiorari, at 18a-19a, Public Citizen II, 114 S. Ct. 685
(1994).
97 See Ian M. Kirschner, Note, NEPA's Forgotten Clause: Impact Statements for Legisla-
tive Proposals, 58 B.U. L. REv. 560, 561-63 (1978). A distinction exists between a "major
federal action" and a legislative proposal. Id. "Almost all of the attention focused on the EIS
requirement... has concerned agency decisions to engage in 'major federal action.' " Id. In
the first year of NEPA's existence, 234 final impact statements were filed for "major federal
action" while only seven were filed for legislative proposals. Id. This number of impact
statements for legislative proposals is extremely low, as evidenced by an early report of
NEPA that estimated that the "workload on environment legislation should probably in-
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burden on the private plaintiff seeking to enforce NEPA's environ-
mental impact statement requirement.9" By definition, proposed
legislation can never directly impact anyone until passed by Con-
gress and signed by the President.99 Indeed, the Council for Envi-
ronmental Quality ("CEQ"), whose binding regulations interpret-
ing NEPA10 0 are entitled to great deference, 01 recognized
legislation subject to NEPA includes proposals for legislation as
well as requests for ratification of treaties developed with signifi-
cant input from a federal agency. 10 2
Such an application of the Franklin decision to NEPA cases is
inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute and inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court decision of Kleppe v. Sierra Club.10 3
The very nature of NEPA requires an ongoing assessment of envi-
ronmental questions throughout the decisionmaking process. 10 4
The Kleppe Court recognized that judicial intervention was not
appropriate until the report or recommendation of the proposal
was made, and a protest was entered regarding the absence or
adequacy of an impact statement.10 5 It is at this moment that an
agency's action has sufficiently matured to assure that judicial in-
tervention will not unnecessarily disrupt the process.10 6 Clearly,
in the case of Public Citizen II, the Trade Office completed its deci-
sion-making process when it submitted the final draft of NAFTA
without an environmental impact statement. 107 The Trade Office's
volve at least 800 or more bills in each session of the Congress.... The full and precise
scope of the 'proposals for legislation' provision is difficult to delineate." Id.
98 See infra note 99 (arguing finality standard too strict).
9 Public Citizen II, 5 F.3d at 553 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing result of such ele-
vated standard would eliminate ability of private groups to enforce NEPA's EIS require-
ment for proposed legislation).
100 See Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1517.7 (1993).
101 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1987) (reiterat-
ing holding in Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1979) that "CEQ regulations
are entitled to substantial deference").
102 Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1993).
103 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976) (rejecting balancing approach used by Court of Appeals
to decide at what point in decision-making process NEPA requires EIS to be completed, and
instead stated that EIS is required once agency has final report completed and is ready to
make recommendation for federal action) (citing Aberdeen and Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP,
422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975)).
104 Id. at 406 n.15 (stating that section 102(2Xc) of NEPA "contemplates a consideration
of environmental factors by agencies during the evolution of a report or recommendation on
a proposal").
105 Id.
106 Id. at 406. The Court stated: "[A premature] judicial involvement in the day to day
decision-making process of the agencies... would invite [unwanted] litigation." Id.
107 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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proposal was no longer a "moving target."108 Furthermore, the ele-
ment of finality was underscored by the fact that, under the rules
of fast-track legislation, NAFTA would not be subject to amend-
ment once it reached the Congress. 10 9 Consideration of any rele-
vant factors must have been done prior to submission to Congress
or remain forever excluded from the trade agreement.
In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens' Council,110 the Supreme
Court again recognized that the preparation of an environmental
impact statement served NEPA's fundamental goal of ensuring
that agencies would avail themselves of information regarding
significant environmental impacts before irreversibly committing
resources."' The Court noted that publication of an impact state-
ment served a broader informational role by guaranteeing that
the interested segments of the public may have the necessary in-
formation to inspire meaningful public discourse." 2
To view the President's participation as the culmination of the
decision making process regarding legislative proposals, and then
place him outside the reach of judicial review, as the court did in
Public Citizen II, distorted the agency's legislative proposal pro-
cess by focusing solely on the President's act of submission, and
not on the lengthy development process pursued by the Trade Of-
fice. 1 13 It bears reiterating that NEPA is a procedural statute;1 14 it
does not seek to control the substance of a final agency report or
108 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
109 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
110 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
111 See id. at 349. "Simply by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental con-
sequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be over-
looked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the
die otherwise cast." Id.
112 Id.; see also Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 365 (1981) (stating that
part of rationale behind NEPA's EIS requirement is to provide information to general pub-
lic who may then choose to influence decision-making process through debate); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding Secretary of Interior's EIS was ade-
quate under NEPA for sale of public lands along Gulf of Mexico in Mississippi, Alabama,
and Florida).
113 See supra note 53.
114 See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic and Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478,
491 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating NEPA's procedural mandate is very broad). But see Don J.
Frost Jr., Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Authority Warranting Recon-
sideration of the Substantive Goals of the National Environmental Policy Act, 5 ALAsKA L.
REV. 15, 48-56 (1988) (suggesting that NEPA's procedural requirements are secondary to
its substantive goals contained in section 101 and that interpreting as solely procedural
statute is against Congressional intent).
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mandate any particular outcome. 115 After completion of the envi-
ronmental impact statement, an agency, the Congress, or the
President, may decide whether other values will predominate. 116
Moreover, the reformulation of "final agency action" by the court
in Public Citizen 11 was contrary to established judicial prac-
tice.1 17 Recognizing that the environmental assessment require-
ment is narrowly focused on agencies and their independent role
in the legislative process, courts have granted judicial review of
claims challenging an agency's exclusion of the statement even
where a subsequent act would be either necessary or discretionary
before the complainant would be directly affected." 8 Presidential
participation in agency actions is a common element in the admin-
istrative landscape, yet standing has been granted to petitioners
in some circumstances involving the powers of the President in
military and foreign affairs." 9 Plaintiffs in Public Citizen II were
115 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1987).
"Although [NEPA] procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive deci-
sion, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process." Id.
116 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350-51. While other environmental statutes may impose
substantive obligations on federal agencies, "NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather
than unwise-agency action." Id.
117 See Petitioners Writ of Certiorari at 12, Public Citizen v. Office of the Trade Repre-
sentative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
118 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142-43 n.7 (1992). "[Olne
living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has stand-
ing to challenge the licensing agencies failure to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the
license to be withheld." Id.; Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1511
(9th Cir. 1992). "Although the [Wilderness] Act vests Congress with exclusive authority to
designate wilderness area," land management plans under direction of Forest agency must
be prepared in compliance with NEPA and plaintiffs have standing to challenge sufficiency
of EIS. Id.; Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (contro-
versy held ripe and plaintiff granted standing to review Department of Interior's refusal to
circulate an EIS in report to be submitted to Congress); Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564
F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977). "[Alppellant had standing, on the basis presumably of the
detrimental environmental impact to appellant that was alleged to result from the erection
of the building." Id.; Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 368 (D. Colo.
1992) (individual may enforce procedural rights so long as procedures in question are
designed to protect some concrete interest of individual); California v. Bergland, 483 F.
Supp. 465, 470-71 (E.D. Cal. 1980), modified, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 758 (9th
Cir. 1982) (President's role in alteration of wilderness recommendations submitted by For-
est Service, and subsequent transmittal of EIS to Congress did not bar challenge of ade-
quacy of EIS).
119 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (stating
that Navy would have to consider environmental effects of constructing nuclear weapons
dump in Hawaii); Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (addressing preparation of EIS for use of incinerator in Antarctica); No-Gwen Alli-
ance, Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1381-84 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing sufficiency of EIS
for Air Force's installation of 300 foot radio towers used to send war messages to U.S. stra-
tegic forces during and after nuclear war); Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445, 461 (8th Cir.
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not trying to enjoin the President from signing NAFTA, or prevent
its transmittal to Congress. 120 Accordingly, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court should have found there was "final agency ac-
tion" sufficient to grant plaintiffs standing.
III. BEYOND STANDING: PUBLIC CITIZEN I ON THE MERITS
A. The Foley Doctrine
Had the court in Public Citizen II found the plaintiffs had stand-
ing it would have been necessary to grapple with the delicate issue
of whether NEPA applied to a treaty such as NAFTA. Where an
environmental impact statement would extend beyond the borders
of the United States, courts have generally analyzed NEPA's ap-
plication by exploring whether the Foley Doctrine is applicable. 121
1988) (en banc) (addressing adequacy of EIS prepared for MX missile project and rejecting
argument that dispute involving political question not subject to judicial review); Wiscon-
sin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 414-17 (7th Cir. 1984) (determining whether supplemen-
tal EIS required for "extremely low frequency" submarine communication system); Sierra
Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir 1978) (discussing adequacy of EIS relating to
construction of international highway pursuant to agreement between United States, Pan-
ama, and Columbia); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (discussing, on merits, applicability of NEPA to United States Navy atomic mis-
sile submarine system and stating that assertion that NEPA not apply to strategic military
decisions is "a flagrant attempt to exempt from the mandate of NEPA all such military
actions under the overused rubric of'national defense' "); Committee for Nuclear Responsi-
bility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
According to the Administrative Conference of the United States, presidential review
"does not displace responsibilities placed in the agency by law. . . ." See ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF THE CAImRMAN, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL
AGENCY RULEMAKING passim (1991 2d ed.) The Conference was established by statute as an
independent agency of the federal government in 1964 to:
[P]romote improvements in the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of procedures by
which federal agencies conduct regulatory programs, administer grants and benefits
and perform related governmental functions... the Conference conducts research and
issues reports concerning various aspects of the administrative process and, when war-
ranted, makes recommendations to the President, Congress, particular departments
and agencies, and the judiciary concerning the need for procedural reforms.
Id. Presidential review is defined as a:
[P]rogram of systematic executive oversight and dialogue that involves coordinating
agency actions where conflicts exist, and in all cases probing the agency's fact and
policy judgments, with the purpose of ensuring that the agency considers factors of
importance to the President's policies to the extent permitted by law.
Id.
120 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
121 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530-31 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (discussing presumption against extraterritoriality); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Greenpeace
USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749,758-59 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d
817 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Other courts have simply sidestepped this issue. See Sierra Club v.
Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (assuming, without deciding, that NEPA applies
to federal highway construction project in Panama); National Org. for the Reform of Mar-
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This doctrine, articulated in Foley Brothers v. Filardo,2 2 creates
the presumption that absent clear congressional intent to the con-
trary, 23 statutes should be construed as enforceable only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.1 24 The Foley Doc-
trine is rooted in the need to respect the jurisdiction of other sov-
juana Laws v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-33 (D.D.C. 1978) (assuming NEPA
applicable to program of Mexican government funded by United States to spray marijuana
crops with toxic herbicide); Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,685, 20,686 (D.D.C. 1974) (avoiding issue of NEPA's extraterritorial applicabil-
ity when AEC agreed voluntarily to conduct worldwide EIS for their nuclear export pro-
gram); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 817-18 (D. Haw. 1973) (holding
NEPA applicable to United States trust territory without rendering decision as to extrater-
ritorial reach).
122 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
123 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. The court stated: "[Tihe presumption will not apply where
there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to extend the scope of
the statute to conduct occurring within other sovereign nations." Id. However, the courts
have found no affirmative intent on the part of Congress to make NEPA applicable to con-
duct outside the United States. Natural Resources Defense Council, 647 F.2d at 1367. "I
must conclude that NEPA's legislative history illuminates nothing in regard to extraterri-
torial application [of NEPA]." Id.; see also VALEmE M. FOGELMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY ACT, 13-14 (1990). The issue of NEPA's extraterritoriality is mul-
tidimensional. Id. According to one commentator:
The issue has several facets. The first facet is determining whether NEPA applies only
to the fifty states or whether it also applies to trust territories and other territory
outside the fifty states. The broad language of NEPA referring to the "nation" rather
than the "United States" has been interpreted to include trust territories. The other
facet of NEPA's extraterritorial application has two components: whether NEPA ap-
plies to actions that affect the global commons such as the oceans and Antarctica, and
whether NEPA applies to actions that only affect the territory of foreign nations. These
issues caused considerable debate during the 1970's, with the CEQ taking the position
that NEPA applied to both types of action.
Id. at 13; see also J.D. Head, Comment, Federal Agency Responsibility to Assess Extraterri-
torial Environmental Impacts, 14 TFjx INr'L L.J. 425, 431 (1979) (providing explanation of
NEPA's ambiguous legislative history concerning its extraterritorial application and also
exploring judicial treatment of issue); c.f Nicholas A. Robinson, Extraterritorial Environ-
mental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs Agencies: The Unfulfilled Mandate of
NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. IN'iL L. & POL. 257, 257-58 (1974) (arguing that intent behind NEPA
was to attack environmental problems globally and hence NEPA was meant to apply to
action by federal agencies operations abroad and proposing that such federal agencies have
insulated themselves from NEPA's mandate thereby frustrating statute's purpose); Com-
ment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment, 131 U. PA. L. Ray. 353, 373 (1982)
(arguing for international application of NEPA based on Congress's intention to approach
problem of environmental degradation on global scale, but noting that NEPA's language
allows for flexibility in international arena by deciding controversies on case-by-case basis).
124 See Foley, 336 U.S. at 281 (holding U.S. "eight hour law" which required all laborers
performing work for contract with U.S. government receive time and a half for any work
done past eight hours a day not applicable to private contractor performing U.S. govern-
ment contract in Iran and Iraq); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas,
738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (federal district court lacked jurisdiction to permit ser-
vice of Brazilian citizen, within Brazil, by Commodities Futures Trading Commission); Mc-
Keel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
880 (1984) (Foley doctrine not applicable to Americans previously held hostage in Iran su-
ing the Iranian government in tort and holding that US embassies not within territorial
jurisdiction of the United States).
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ereigns and avoid conflict of laws issues which could result in in-
ternational turmoil. 125
Since NEPA solely regulates the internal decision-making pro-
cess of federal agencies within the United States, 126 technically
there is no extraterritorial issue raised.127 In the context of Public
Citizen II, the enforcement of NEPA would merely have regulated
the Trade Office's internal decision-making process, 12  without
threatening the substantive integrity of the actual agreement. 29
Once the decision making process is separated from the substance
of NAFTA, it is apparent that such regulation is within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of Congress, and therefore raises no extraterri-
torial issues.130 All NEPA could have required of the Trade Office
was preparation of an environmental impact statement for
NAFTA. l 3 l An environmental impact statement would have re-
sulted in a more informed debate about NAFTA, and therefore ful-
filled the informational role of NEPA.13 2
125 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 cmt. g (1987).
126 See supra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
127 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Mary A. McDougall, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 80 GEo.
L.J. 435, 437 (1991) (arguing, in context of Endangered Species Act, that there can be no
extraterritoriality issue where statute merely regulates procedure of federal agencies deci-
sion-making process because that process occurs within United States).
128 See supra note 127.
129 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (holding it
is well settled that NEPA is purely procedural statute and never mandates particular re-
sult after EIS is prepared).
130 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding there is jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust laws where disputed conduct is
intended to and does have significant impact within United States); Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (extending U.S. securities laws to actions abroad
where necessary to protect American investors), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215, 218-
19 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (finding plaintiff not entitled to summary judgment); see RE-
STATEMENT (THRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403 cmt. g (1987). It
should also be noted that even if NEPA were deemed to regulate conduct outside the na-
tional borders the presumption against extraterritoriality would still not be applicable in
the case of NAFTA due to the impact it will likely have within the United States, especially
along the Mexican border. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(1)(a) (presumption against extraterritoriality not applicable where to not do
so would precipitate adverse results within United States). The Trade Office's own "Envi-
ronmental Review" of NAFTA concluded the agreement would probably exacerbate the well
known environmental problems that already plague the U.S.-Mexico border region. See Re-
view of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues, Executive Summary, pgs 3-7. Furthermore,
Public Citizen had alleged extensive harmful environmental impacts within the United
States. Brief for Appellant at 27(a) n. 11, Public Citizen v. Office of the Trade Representa-
tive, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
131 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
132 See supra note 112 (discussing informational role of NEPA).
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B. Foreign Policy Concerns Under NEPA Section 102(2)(F)
The second issue presented by the application of NEPA to
NAFTA arises from the express language of NEPA.113 Where pre-
paring of an environmental impact statement would be contrary
to U.S. foreign policy interests, section 102(2)(F) of NEPA has
been interpreted to create an exception to NEPA's environmental
impact statement requirement. 3 4 In tackling the issue of whether
NEPA mandates an impact statement in circumstances affecting
foreign policy interests, courts have balanced the specific foreign
policy interests implicated in the suit against the environmental
goals of NEPA. 135
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,136 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was not compelled to
prepare an environmental impact statement regarding the issu-
ance of a nuclear technology export license to the Philippines. 137
The court reasoned that such an application of NEPA was incon-
sistent with U.S. foreign policy, 138 because it would impose United
States regulations within the Philippines and inappropriately su-
persede Philippine law.139 Also, construing NEPA in this manner
would open the door to a flood of litigation challenging the ade-
quacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's environmental im-
pact statements every time an export license was granted. 140 Such
litigation would cause lengthy delays, and thus frustrate congres-
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
134 See id. The statute requires that all federal agencies:
Recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and,
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support
to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international coopera-
tion in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment
Id.; see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 534-35 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 748, 759 (D. Haw. 1990).
135 See Massey, 986 F.2d at 535; Natural Resources Defense Council, 647 F.2d at 1357;
Stone, 748 F. Supp. at 759.
136 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
137 Id. at 1365.
138 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (1988).
139 647 F.2d at 1356-57. The court found this a form of regulatory coercion incompatible
with U.S. foreign policy objectives and NEPA itself which emphasizes cooperation, not uni-
lateral action. Id. at 1366.
140 Id.
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sional intent behind the statute authorizing the issuance of
licenses.141
As in NRDC, compelling the Trade Office in Public Citizen II to
conduct an independent environmental impact statement for
NAFTA would have been tantamount to "regulatory coercion."" 2
The court in NRDC believed that this type of coercion should be
avoided under NEPA, which seeks international cooperation,
rather than unilateral action. 43 The element of the NRDC ration-
ale that sought to avoid undue delays caused by private parties
seeking NEPA injunctions was equally applicable to Public Citi-
zen II.14 Requiring an environmental impact statement after the
treaty and the environmental side agreements had been negoti-
ated and signed would have undermined the United States' posi-
tion as a willing and cooperative partner in NAFTA. 145 Moreover,
such a ruling could have delayed or disrupted the ratification pro-
cess and frustrated the political will to enter into a binding trade
agreement. 146
Following the NRDC approach, the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii in Greenpeace v. Stone,1 47 held that the
United States Army could not be compelled to perform an environ-
mental impact statement before transporting chemical weapons
from West Germany to Johnston Atoll.14 District Judge Ezra rea-
soned that conducting an impact statement would be intrusive
upon German sovereignty. 149 The court noted in dicta that an im-
portant factor in deciding whether NEPA should be applicable,
was whether the relevant agency had already made an effort to
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1356.
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XF) (1988).
144 See supra notes 138-39.
145 See infra note 146.
146 See 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c), (d), (e) (1988). By Congress not affirmatively acting to con-
trary, fast-track procedures were automatically made available under Trade Act of 1974.
Id. Indeed, President Bush said in a letter to Congress that "[miaintaining fast-track is
essential to our leadership in the global trading system." See Peter Truell, Bush Asks Con-
gress For Special Authorization to Negotiate Liberalized Trade Rules, WALL ST. J., March 4,
1991, at A2.
147 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
148 Id. at 754. This action was performed pursuant to an executive agreement signed by
President Bush and West Germany's Chancellor Kohl. Id. The executive agreement was
also authorized by act of Congress. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-145, § 1412(a), 99 Stat. 583, 747 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. § 118, 102 Stat.
1918, 1934 (1988).
149 Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 748, 760 (D. Haw. 1990).
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determine the environmental impact of the action.1 50 In the con-
text of Public Citizen 11 the governments of the United States,
Mexico, and Canada addressed the potential environmental ef-
fects that the implementation of NAFTA would precipitate in the
environmental "side-agreement." l5 '
Also instructive is the case of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Massey,152 which similar to Public Citizen H, involved a defend-
ant agency in the midst of negotiating a treaty.15 3 The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the National Science Foundation from operating
a garbage incinerator at a research facility in Antarctica, until an
impact statement was furnished.154 When the action was com-
menced, the United States was negotiating a treaty with several
other countries in an effort to provide for international protection
of the Antarctic environment.Is5 The National Science Foundation
argued the injunction should not be granted since it would inevita-
bly interfere with the ongoing treaty negotiations, and therefore
disrupt legitimate foreign policy objectives of the United States in
two respects.' 56 First, they alleged that forcing the development of
an environmental impact statement would make the United
States an unsure partner in the delicate treaty negotiations, be-
cause the proposed treaty called for the signatory nations to ap-
proach Antarctica's environmental problems jointly through coop-
eration.'5 7 Applying U.S. law to the region, through NEPA, would
usurp the intended role of the prospective treaty. 158 Secondly, the
defendant argued that an environmental impact statement would
conflict with the procedural duties articulated in the prospective
treaty. 1 9
150 See id. at 761 (citing Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
151 North American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation, available in
WESTLAW, NAFTA database (1993). This so-called environmental side agreement was fi-
nalized August 12, 1993 and incorporated into the treaty.
162 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
153 See id. at 534.
154 Id. at 529. The National Science Foundation operates the research facilities in Ant-
arctica under the U.S. Antarctica Program. Id. The decision was made to begin using an
incinerator to dispose of food waste created at the station in early 1991. Id. After it was
discovered the open landfill used to burn the waste contained asbestos NSF immediately
began using an incinerator to burn the waste while a state of the art incinerator was in the
process of being delivered. Id.
155 Protocol on the Environmental Protection of the Antarctic Treaty, reprinted in 30
International Legal Materials 1461 (1991).
16 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
157 See supra note 19.
168 Massey, 986 F.2d at 535-36.
159 Id. at 534-35.
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The Massey court rejected the first argument because the treaty
was neither signed nor enforceable.' 60 Likewise, the court was un-
persuaded by the second argument because the impact statement
would not have interfered with any future duties under the treaty,
but coincide with such duties.1 6 1 The proposed treaty would re-
quire an environmental impact statement even where the action
being considered would have only "minor or transitory" effects, as
compared to significant impact under NEPA.162 The Massey court
also found it significant that Antarctica is not under sovereign
rule and thus there was little chance of conflict of laws problems
arising.' 63 Furthermore, of all the nations involved in the treaty
negotiations, the United States had the most influential presence
in Antarctica and was therefore in the best position to regulate the
region. 164
It is tempting to analogize Public Citizen II to Massey simply
because both cases involved treaties. However the cases are dis-
tinguishable in several respects. 165 First, in Massey, the court rec-
ognized that the proposed treaty was years from ratification, 166
while NAFTA was signed by the President and received "fast
track" status from Congress. 167 Thus, once submitted, only sixty
days were allotted for Congress to decide whether NAFTA would
be ratified without amendment.16 8 Perhaps most importantly, the
Massey court placed substantial weight on the fact that Antarctica
is under no sovereign and that only the United States was in a
position to regulate.' 69 In the context of Public Citizen II, the main
environmental concerns focused on the potential effects of Mex-
ico's maquiladora industrial plants that cluster along the border of
the United States and Mexico. 170 Therefore, an extensive environ-
mental impact statement would have involved Mexican coopera-
160 Id.
161 Id. at 534. Presumably an EIS prepared under NEPA would be sufficient to discharge
NSF's future procedural duties under the treaty with respect to incinerator. Id. The court
found no extraterritoriality issue to exist because Antarctica is not controlled by any sover-
eign governments, and the United States, of all nations, had the most substantial contacts
there. Id. at 533-34.
162 Id. at 535.
163 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
164 Id. at 533-34.
165 See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
166 Massey, 986 F.2d at 534.
167 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)-(e) (1988).
168 See supra note 167.
169 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
170 See supra note 55 (discussing maquiladora program).
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tion, and thus Mexican compliance with the law of the United
States. Such a unilateral effort by the United States would be
contrary to the partnership spirit of NAFTA, and the interna-
tional cooperation embraced by NEPA.171 Considering the envi-
ronmental side agreement incorporated into NAFTA, the Trade
Office's own internal study, 172 and the joint environmental plan
for the border region conducted by the Environmental Protection
Agency and its Mexican counterpart, 173 it is clear that the envi-
ronmental issues raised by NAFTA have been dealt with through
cooperation. In accordance with this caselaw, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals should have found NAFTA to be within the "for-
eign policy" exception created by section 102(2)(F) of NEPA.
CONCLUSION
In Public Citizen H, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
was presented with the opportunity to determine the level of
standing plaintiff's must meet in order to enforce NEPA. Rather
than applying an undly restrictive interpretation of standing and
"final agency action", the court could have, and perhaps should
have, disposed of the case by using Section 102(2)(F) of NEPA on
the ground that foreign policy interests were implicated. The ben-
efit of this approach would be that only those NEPA claims involv-
ing substantial foreign policy interests would be susceptible to a
narrower standing scrutiny. By not following this route, the court
has traveled futher down the path in making NEPA a less effec-
tive weapon.
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171 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
172 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MExIco ENVIRONMENTAL Is-
suEs (1992).
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